Taxation -- Interrelation of Income and Gift Taxes -- Gift Tax Status of Income of Trust Which Is Taxable to Donor by McCoy, Donald W.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 26 | Number 4 Article 13
6-1-1948
Taxation -- Interrelation of Income and Gift Taxes --
Gift Tax Status of Income of Trust Which Is
Taxable to Donor
Donald W. McCoy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald W. McCoy, Taxation -- Interrelation of Income and Gift Taxes -- Gift Tax Status of Income of Trust Which Is Taxable to Donor, 26
N.C. L. Rev. 420 (1948).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol26/iss4/13
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Graham v. Hoke,'3 however, the plaintiff rendered personal
services to deceased in reliance on his promise of $2,000 to be paid out
of his estate at death. The court held that "the plaintiff having de-
clared on a 'written agreement' as a special contract, she is not al-
lowed to likewise declare upon an implied contract of quantum meruit,
and in truth she has not so declared. True she may have pleaded an
implied contract as well as a special contract in the alternative, but
when the case came on for trial she could have been compelled to elect
upon which declaration she would proceed." This decision was a de-
parture from the established line of decisions, as well as from the
spirit and purpose of the Code System. Sufficient facts were set out
to establish a cause of action in quantum meruit, and in allowing a
demurrer the court was reverting to the technical pleading of common
law by placing more emphasis on the form or theory of the action than
on the facts presented.
The principal case clarifies the position of the court and indicates
a return to, and reaffirmance of, the liberal policy of the Code to allow
any relief to which the facts proven may entitle the plaintiff to re-
cover.1 4 'It establishes the rule that a plaintiff may declare on an ex-
press oral contract to devise realty and, if sufficient fact are alleged and
proven of services rendered, recover on quantum reruit when the con-
tract is unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds, thus
clearly indicating that there will be no binding election in this situation.
Notwithstanding that relief may be secured under this mode of
pleading, it is submitted that the desirable method is to set out the
express contract and implied contract separately, or to state the ex-
press contract as an inducement or explanation of the implied con-
tract and allege that the deceased received the benefits of service in-
duced thereby.15
ROBERT G. STOCKTON.
Taxation-Interrelation of Income and Gift Taxes-Gift Tax
Status of Income of Trust Which Is Taxable to Donor
The Commissioner assessed gift* taxes against the respondent for
the net gains and profits from trading in securities and commodity fu-
tures of two trusts created by the respondent and his wife for the
benefit of their three children. The trusts were irrevocable, and the
settlor retained no right to alter or amend the ti-ust instrument, or to
change the beneficial interests. The trusts consisted of trading ac-
counts *on the books of a partnership composed of the respondent, his
13219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. 2d 790 (1941).
" CLARK, CODE PLEADING §43 (2d ed. 1947).
10MCINTOSH, 'NORTH CAROLINA PRACrIzc AND PROCEDURE §410 (1929);
1 MORDEcAI, LAw LEcrums 127 (2d ed. 1916).
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wife, and children. The net worth of each trust in each of the years
for which gift taxes were assessed was more than sufficient to provide
the margins required to cover the trading carried on for it. In a
prior case involving the same trusts, it was held that the income from
trading on margin realized by the trusts was taxable to the settlor as
this income was directly attributable to the voluntary exercise of his
personal skill in trading for the account of the trusts and constituted
a voluntary assignment of a portion of his personal earnings.' Held:
the net income derived from trading on behalf of the trusts accrued
immediately and directly to the trusts; respondent never owned or
held an economic interest in such income; and he could not withhold
any part thereof from the trusts. Hence the income did not represent
a taxable gift from the respondent.2
The interrelation of the income, estate and gift taxes, or the lack
of it, has claimed the attention of writers3 and of the courts.4  In
Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue5 the court remarked,
".. . without further aid from Congress it is perhaps impossible for
the courts to work out a complete integration of the three taxes." An
analysis of the cases will demonstrate the difficulties and confusion.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Prouty6 the taxpayer
had created three trusts. In 1935 she relinquished all reserved power
to revoke or amend the instruments and the Commissioner assessed
gift taxes at that time. The court found that in two of the trusts the
taxpayer's husband-beneficiary had no substantial adverse interest be-
fore the surrender of powers by the taxpayer and that gift taxes were
properly assessed in 1935. Finding a substantial adverse interest in
the third trust prior to the surrender of powers led the court to hold
that as to this trust the transfer was completed prior to the effective
date of the gift tax. The Commissioner contended that under the
Clifford7 rule the taxpayer remained in substance the owner of the
corpus and that the gift being regarded as incomplete for income tax
'Hogle "v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 132 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 10th
1942). This case contains a detailed account of the trusts and shows the first
trust had a liquidating value of slightly over $745,0)0 in 1940 and the second
trust $200,000 at the same time.
2Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352 (C. C. A. 10th
1947).
'Greenfield, Correlation of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 16 TEMPLE
L. Q. 194 (1942). Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate,
and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV.
L. R. 337 (1942). 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §17.03 et. seq.
(1942).
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A.
2d 1942), Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F. 2d 237 (C. C. A.
1st 1942).
129 F. 2d 237, 239 (C. C. A. 1st 1942).
8115 F. 2d 331 (C. C. A. 1st 1940).
' Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S.. 331 (1940).
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should be similarly regarded for purposes of the gift tax. The court
stated that it was far from clear that the Clifford rule applied but
that if it did the gift tax was not so closely integrated with the income
tax that taxing the income of a trust to the grantor would lead to the
conclusion that no gift tax was payable upon the creation of the trust.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Beck's Estate8 the tax-
payer transferred securities and insurance policies on his life to the
trustee. The income of the trust was to be used to pay premiums
on the insurance and at the taxpayer's death the proceeds of the pol-
icies were to become a part of the corpus. The taxpayer, in computing
the gift tax, deducted the capitalized value of the income necessary
to pay the premiums during his life expectancy on the theory that
this portion was not a gift as the income remained taxable to him by
virtue of Section 167 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court
held the taxpayer liable for the gift tax on the amount deducted. This
created a situation where the taxpayer was liable for the gift tax on
property because he transferred it away, and yet remained liable for
the income tax on the income of the same property.9
In Lockard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'0 the taxpayer
creAted an irrevocable short-term trust in 1938 and in 1939 transferred
additional property to the trust. In 1941 the taxpayer claimed the
fuill $40,000 exemption."1 The Commissioner disallowed a portion of
this exemption on the ground that the taxpayer had claimed an exemp-
tion on the gifts of 1938 and 1939. The taxpayer contended that,
is she was taxed on the income of the trusts under the Clifford rule,
no gifts were made until the income was distributed to her beneficiary.
The court dismissed this contention saying that the income tax and
the gift tax each had its own independent criteria and that for purposes
of the gift tax the transfers were complete in 1938 and 1939 and the
gift tax exemptions then claimed must stand.' 2
The rule of these cases seems to be that when under applicable law,
the legal title to income vests in one person when it arises, but under
federal revenue laws is taxed to another, there is no gift tax liability
when the incoime is paid over to the former. This doctrine would seem
to apply to family partnership of the Tower'3 or Lusthaus14 variety
8.129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
' See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §17.19 (1942) for a
criticism of the B. T. A. decision in favor of the taxpayer in the Beck case.10 166 F. 2d 409 (C. C. A. 1st 1948).
" INT. REv. CODE §1004 (exemption now $30,000).
12 In the Tax Court it was held that the transfers in trust were complete in
1938 and 1939 for gift tax purposes on the authority of Hogle v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 986 (1946) without a discussion of any difference
in the cases. Lockard v. Commissiofier of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 1151 (1946).
3 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
" Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Intetnal Revente, 327 U. S. 293 (1946).
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in that under partnership law1 5 the ownership of the income would be
in the donee while the donor remained taxable on the same income.
The income in the Hogle case was profits arising directly from the
personal activities of the settlor and the analogy to the partnership
cases is close.
The courts have determined that the "broad sweep" of Section 22
(a) does not require the penetration of the legal form of the trans-
action when incidence of the gift tax is the subject of the inquiry16
because the gift tax issue is ownership while the income tax issue
in trust cases is whether the settlor retained rights equivalent to
substantial ownership' 7 and in partnership case is whether the donor
earned the income.' s
The .Hogle case says that it represents a refusal to make an un-
justified extension of the Clifford doctrine,19 but does it? The gift
tax is imposed in the year in which the transfer is consummated 2 0
In the present case the real gifts appear to have come in the years for
which the Commissioner assessed the gift tax and to have been in-
complete before that time.21 At the time the trusts were created
they consisted of trading accounts and no property was transferred.22
The income sought to be made subject to the gift tax arose from the
personal efforts and skill of Hogle and not from the corpus of the
trust.23 The court appears to have indicated a method whereby a tax-
payer can transfer to his beneficiaries the fruit of his skill and labor
without the transfer being subject to either gift or estate taxes.2 4
In any event, the lack of forceful and convincing reasoning to support
the Hogle decision indicates the need for clarification either by Congress
or the Supreme Court.2 5
DONALD W. McCoy.
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §24.
"' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Prouiy, 115 F. 2d 331, 337 (C. C. A.
1st 1940) ; Lockard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 166 F. 2d 409,
C. C. A. 1st 1948). See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL. ESTATE AND GIr TAXATIONt §17.17
(1942).
"Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
"Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352, 352 (C. C. A.
10th 1948).210 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933).
"This is the theory on which the dissent in the tax court would have im-
posed the gift tax. Hogle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C.
986, 990 (1946).
2Hogle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 986, 987 (1947).
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352, 353 (C. C. A.
10th 1947).
" By setting up trading accounts in trust as was done in the Hogle case or
by the gift of a portion of a partnership to a member of the family. tCompare
the gift tax status of a salaried man who makes an assignment of unearned
future income. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §16.12 (1942).
" The government has indicated it will not appeal the Hogle case. CCH FED.
EST: & GIFT TAX REP. 9800 (1946).
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